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[The doctrine of political responsibility] states, in its most general form,
that political officials must make only such political decisions as they can
justify within a political theory that also justifies the other decisions they
propose to make. The doctrine seems innocuous in this general form; but it
does, even in this form, condemn a style of political administration that
might be called, following Rawls, intuitionistic. It condemns the practice of
making decisions that seem right in isolation, but cannot be brought within
some comprehensive theory of general principles and policies that is con-
sistent with other decisions also thought right.... This doctrine demands,
we might say, articulate consistency.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Environmental law does not operate with articulate consistency. It
could, but it does not. The current trend in environmental protection and
urban planning is towards "intuitionistic" administration. In the United
States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, decision makers have yet to
establish general rules that stipulate outcomes. The conception of environ-
mental harm often reflected in regulatory action is: 'We can't define it, but
we know it when we see it." There is still no description of the meaning of
environmental protection in abstract legal terms.
This state of affairs can be seen in at least five areas: (1) Ecosystem
management, which is based upon the proposition that management deci-
sions should be based upon specific scientific evidence about specific envi-
" Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.
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ronmental scenarios; (2) Environmental assessment, which consists of pro-
cedural requirements to gather and consider information, rather than a sub-
stantive litmus test for environmental impact; (3) Urban planning processes,
which lack generally applicable land-use rules, and instead depend upon site
specific and project specific evaluations; (4) Environmental protection re-
gimes, in which statutes typically contain vague objectives instead of rules,
and regulations prescribe specific standards for specific substances in spe-
cific circumstances; and (5) Enforcement of statutes and regulations, which
may occur not on the basis of conceptually precise criteria, but upon non-
environmental considerations.2 In each of these areas, there is no articula-
tion in environmental or ecological terms of generally applicable principles
by which decisions are to be made.
II. PROBLEMS WITH INTUITIONISTIC DECISION MAKING
Under the traditional common law model, conflicts are resolved by de-
cision makers such as judges and juries who have no interest in disputes,
and indeed know nothing about them. Decisions are made by applying gen-
eral rules to the facts at hand, rules which are applied without regard for the
parties' status, wealth or popularity. Those rules come from a legislative
authority, thus preserving a separation of powers; or the rules are created by
precedent, thus following the principle that like cases should be decided
alike. To a substantial degree, urban planning and environmental manage-
ment techniques do not follow these legal norms. Instead, they combine
rule making and decision making; they create particular rules for particular
facts; they allow cases to be decided by authorities who consider themselves
to have a great deal of interest in the outcome, and a great deal of discretion
in deciding the outcome; they do not require decisions to be bound by pre-
vious decisions; and the main criterion applied is a vague concept of the
public interest.
At least three troubling symptoms exist in the face of such environ-
2. Howard Latin describes eight "laws" of administrative behavior
(1) In Conflicts Between Political Considerations and Technocratic Require-
ments, Politics Usually Prevails; (2) Agencies Avoid Making Regulatory Deci-
sions that Would Create Severe Social or Economic Dislocation; (3) Agencies
Avoid Resolving Disputed Issues Unless They Can Render Scientifically Credi-
ble Judgments; (4) Agencies Will Not Meet Statutory Deadlines If Budget Ap-
propriations, Personnel, Information, or Other Resources Are Inadequate; (5)
Regulators Are Influenced by Disciplinary Norms that May Conflict with Statu-
tory Mandates; (6) Bureaucrats Are Conditioned by Criticism or Other Forms of
Negative Feedback; (7) Agency Behavior is Partly Conditioned by Manipulative
Tactics of Regulated Parties; and (8) Administrators of Multiple-purpose Stat-
utes Usually "Simplify" the Decisional Process to Emphasize Only One or Two
Statutory Goals.
Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the New Clean Air Act,
21 ENVWrL. L. 1647, 1651 (1991).
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mental management and planning systems:
1. Environmental Decline: Environmental management seems to allow
continued environmental decline. It is difficult to demonstrate cause and ef-
fect in this respect, but it is at least possible to observe that environmental
damage does occur under such regulatory regimes. It is also possible to
suggest one reason why this might be so: when there is less law and more
discretion, there is more room for compromise. In the absence of a bright
line rule, decision makers have room to seek a middle ground. Compromise
is often a good way to resolve disputes. However, it is less frequently so in
environmental matters? The past half century has seen many conflicts be-
tween dire environmental consequences of allowing an activity to proceed
and apparently dire economic consequences of preventing the activity from
occurring. Such conflicts are apt to be resolved by finding a compromise -
by scaling back or limiting the activity in some way to reap economic bene-
fits and reduce environmental impacts. It is possible to characterize minor
environmental impacts as inconsequential, but significant long term envi-
ronmental changes can be caused by the accumulation of small impacts.
Compromise allows environmental death from a thousand inconsequential
cuts.
2. Serfdom: Isolated decision making in the urban planning context
produces a phenomenon that Professor Robin Molloy of Syracuse Univer-
sity calls "serfdom," in which legal outcomes depend upon personal status
in the political sphere. In such a legal environment, what people are allowed
to do depends upon who they know, on whether their projects seem politi-
cally advantageous, on whether they fit a planner's vision for a particular
urban landscape, or on whether they benefit a city's financial interests.
Public entrepreneurialism, the participation of the public purse in urban de-
velopment, is part of this phenomenon. Malloy states:
In today's environment, city planners and politicians are no longer con-
tent to map out general restrictions governing land use. Rather, they
3. Environmental disputes often depend on which side is scientifically correct. In such
cases, compromise may obscure the accuracy of the correct party's assertion. Paul Ehrlich
illustrates the idea this way:
Laypeople frequently assume that in a political dispute the truth must lie some-
where in the middle, and they are often right. In a scientific dispute, though,
such an assumption is usually wrong. Copernicus ... showed (to the distress of
the establishment) that the earth both rotated on its axis and, along with the other
planets, revolved around the sun. The controversy about what revolved where
was not resolved by a compromise that had the earth stationary on its axis but
circling the sun. Pasteur put an end to the debate over whether some organisms
could be produced by "spontaneous generation" by showing that bacteria de-
scended from other bacteria. The answer wasn't a compromise in which mice
couldn't be spontaneously generated whereas flies and microbes could.
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seek to actively participate in real estate development-to participate in
the entrepreneurial fulfillment of specific city planned projects that they
themselves see as essential to the successful development and marketing
of their urban identity. Public officials constantly provide ample rhetoric
in support of the free marketplace, competition, private enterprise, and
rugged individualism. However, in complete contradiction to this rheto-
ric is an urban development program based on centralized urban plan-
ning, public management, and government ownership of almost every
major new commercial project in the urban center.
The participation of the public purse in urban development produces
conflict of interest, an increased likelihood that decisions will be made for
the wrong reasons, and a blurring of public and private domains.
3. Complicated and Uncertain Law: When statutes are extremely vague
and regulations are extremely specific, many regulations will be required
because they are the only source of meaningful rules. This is especially so
when the subject matter is as wide and varied as the environment. The vol-
ume of environmental regulation, including plans, policies, guidelines, by-
laws and other instruments, is immense. It is difficult to comprehend. Its
particularized nature means that it is difficult to find a central conceptual
thread or set of core principles that explain why it says what it says. It is not
a coherent whole, but a collection of isolated rules for isolated circum-
stances.
HI. RESULTS VS. REASONS
One of the causes of "intuitionistic" environmental law is the impor-
tance placed by planners and regulators upon results rather than upon rea-
soning. They are not unique in this respect: it is not uncommon for people
concerned about societal trends to concentrate on the results of particular
decisions rather than on the rationales on which decisions are based. This
happens, for example, at both political extremes: the left favors free choice
when the issue is marijuana use, but favors compulsion when the issue is
union membership. The right favors the reverse. For both, a decision is
properly made if the result is proper; to neither is it important that the same
reasoning be applied to both questions. The same kind of focus is evident in
environmental and urban planning. Their practitioners say that they need to
control results. They say that they know what the results ought to be in each
particular case, and if the result is right, the process by which the result is
achieved is not that important. For example, Daniel Botkin, a biologist at
the University of California, writes in his book Discordant Harmonies: A
New Ecology for the Twenty First Century that the proper approach to envi-
ronmental stewardship is a system of ecosystem management which:
4. Robin P. Malloy, Planning for Serfdom-An Introduction to a New Theory of Law
and Economics, 25 IND. L. REV. 621, 626, 628 (1992).
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requires specific knowledge because policies must be specific .... The
task before us is to understand the biological world to the point that we
can learn how to live within the discordant harmonies of our biological
surroundings, so that they function not only to promote the continuation
of life but also to benefit ourselves: our aesthetics, morality, philosophies
and material needs.'
IV. TECHNIQUES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM SOLVING
First year law students learn that "doing law" is about moving from
concrete facts to abstract rules and back again. They learn that a judicial de-
cision is not just the declaration of a winner from a set of facts, but that it
also reflects a rule or principle that can be found by abstracting the result.
That rule or principle can then be applied to new concrete situations. This
back-and-forth between concrete and abstract is the heart of the way com-
mon law systems work.
When a precedent is said to be applicable to a set of facts, it is so be-
cause the new case resembles, in some abstract way, the old one. For exam-
ple, it is applicable not because both an old case and a new one involved
pregnant women slipping on icy sidewalks in front of Target stores, but be-
cause both involved personal injury arising from a danger on premises that
the occupier failed to rectify and warn against. Similarly, when a case is
said to be distinguishable, it is different from previous situations in some
abstract respect. If the slip and fall occurred outside KMart instead of Tar-
get, that is a factual difference, not an abstract one: it does not affect the ap-
plicability of the abstract rule. But if the sidewalk outside the store was
public property rather than private, a different kind of factor exists in the
new case that did not exist in the old.
Thus, moving between concrete and abstract is an inherent part of fol-
lowing precedent. The role of abstraction is broad; it is not limited to inter-
pretation of judicial decisions. For example, legislatures express their intent
in statutory terms which are abstract to some degree. A rule in a statute
which provides for equal shares of family property for both spouses upon
breakdown of a marriage is an abstraction: it says all people who fall into an
abstract category, even if they may be in quite different factual situations,
will be subject to the same principle. Regardless of infinitely variable char-
acteristics (whether relationships are nasty or amiable, two years long or
twenty years long, with or without children who happen to be boys or girls,
and so on), any marriage that comes apart is subject to the same general
rule.
Ecologists and geographers insist that environmental decisions cannot
be made with abstract, generally applicable rules. They say that the science
5. DANIEL B. BoTKiN, DiscoRDANT HARMoNIEs: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 191, 197 (1990).
1998]
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is too uncertain, the systems too different, the information too voluminous,
and the human factors too important to express ideas in general terms. In
order to deal with these difficulties, they say that decisions must be made on
an isolated basis. They essentially argue that vague criteria be applied to
each proposed action-each development proposal, each rezoning applica-
tion, each pipeline, each clear cut, and each dam. There is a preference
within the planning and environmental management fraternities for making
decisions one situation at a time. Scientists would abhor labelling this proc-
ess "intuitionistic" because it calls for the best scientific evidence available.
The point, however, does not concern the kind of evidence to be evaluated,
but whether there are general principles to be applied. Practitioners' objec-
tions to abstract rules reflect a misconception about the way law works.
Courts frequently decide cases fraught with scientific and evidential uncer-
tainty. Expert evidence on contentious questions frequently conflicts. Such
conflicts may produce difficult questions of fact, but they do not necessarily
produce difficult questions of law. Evidential uncertainty may make ab-
stract rules difficult to apply, but it does not suggest that they should not
exist. It is quite true that there are an infinite number of interactions occur-
ring in an infinite number of different ecosystems. The numbers are so vast
that they cannot all be documented, much less be understood. That is a rea-
son to favor abstraction, not a reason to avoid it.
6
The nature of environmental problems does not foreclose abstraction.
Consider a hypothetical standard issued under an imaginary statute. Assume
that the statute's objective simply is to "prohibit pollution that harms the
environment and endangers human health." The standard restricts the con-
centration of substance X in effluent to .02 micrograms per litre. There is
no general rule other than the vague objective in the statute-no other ab-
stract articulation of the level at which the standard is to be set. How was
the standard arrived at? Is it completely dependent on the facts? Or is there
an abstract idea that can be extracted from the decision about substance X
and used to guide the decision on substance Y? Questioning the regulator
might produce the following:
Question: Why is the standard for this permit set at .02 ptg/l?
Answer: That is the level that protects the environment and human
health.
Question: What do you mean? What happens if we allow concentrations
above .02 tg/l?
Answer: Concentration of the substance accumulates in fish and fish
die.
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Question: At .02 gxg/l, there is no accumulated concentration or fish loss?
Answer: Well, yes, there will be some; certainly a risk of some.
Question: Well then, what happens at .03 gxg/1 that does not happen at
.02 jtg/l?
Answer: A greater incidence of fish death and higher biomagnification
of the substance in fish tissue.
Question: Could you not say the same between .02 jtg/I and .01 ptg/l?
Answer: I beg your pardon?
Question: Would there not be a greater incidence of fish death and
higher accumulation of the substance in fish tissue at .02 jig/l
than at .01 gig/l?
Answer: Yes.
Question: Then your description does not explain why the proper stan-
dard is located at .02 jtg/l rather than .03 jtg/I or .01 jig/l.
Why did you draw the line at .02 jtg/I in this particular case?
Answer: We lose an unacceptable number of fish at .03 jtg/l.
Question: How many?
Answer: It is not a question of an absolute number. It is impossible to
know exactly how many.
Question: Then the effect you are preventing is not based on an absolute
number of fish lost.
Answer: No.
Question: Then what makes the number unacceptable?
Answer: The proportion of the population that the estimated number of
deaths represents.
Question: Population of a particular species?
Answer: Yes.
Question: Which species?
Answer: The spotted waddlefish.
7
7. As far as the author knows, this is an imaginary species.
1998] 433
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Question: Why the spotted waddlefish?
Answer: It is one of the most sensitive species of fish in many of the
bodies of water into which substance X is expected to be dis-
charged.
Question: Is it one of the most sensitive species of fish, or one of the
most sensitive species of any kind of life in these bodies of
water?
Answer: Our best information indicates the latter, although there may
be species of which we are not yet aware.
Question: Is it more sensitive generally, or only with respect to substanceX?
Answer: It is more sensitive in several respects, but the relevant respect
is in relation to exposure to substance X.
Question: What percentage loss of the population is too high?
Answer: We set 10% as the maximum tolerable loss.
Question: Why 10%?
Answer: That is the portion of population fromwhich the spotted wad-
dlefish should be able to recover on an annual basis.
Question: What is that conclusion based on?
Answer: Its reproductive frequency and survival rate is such that young
fish that would otherwise naturally die from lack of food will
be available to fill in the population that is lost from exposure
to substance X.
Question: So the rule you are really applying is that contamination must
be kept to a level which will allow the most sensitive species
to recover.
Answer: Yes.
Question: Over what period of time are you measuring?
Answer: For the effect on the species?
Question: Yes.
Answer: Forever.
Question: So when you calculate what percentage of fish can be permit-
ted to be lost, is that per year or total?
[Vol. 34
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Question: So there will be the same percentage of that species that are
lost each year if that same level of contamination is main-
tained?
Answer: Yes, but there will be substantial recovery every reproductive
cycle also, as I said.
Question: So is your stock getting smaller every year?
Answer: Hopefully, no.
Question: So the standard is based on the loss the species could tolerate
and still recover to its original pre-impact population, or sim-
ply not die off altogether?
Answer: Return to its original pre-impact population.
Question: So contamination must be kept to a level at which the most
sensitive species will maintain its original population level.
Answer: Yes. Such levels are never static, even in the absence of con-
taminants, but the fluctuations should be unaffected in the
long run by the presence of substance X.
Question: And you have factored in the effects of biomagnification, and
synergistic and cumulative effects of other toxic substances
that might be in the water?
Answer: To the best of our ability.
Question: What do you mean by that?
Answer: It is impossible to know conclusively all the other substances
that might be present in all the bodies of water to which the
standard applies.
Question: Then how do you draw the line?
Answer: We gather as much information as we can about other sus-
pected hazardous substances.
Question: So you are limited by your investigative technology?
Answer: Yes, and by time.
Question: How do you decide what to look for?
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Question: So you do not actually go and take comprehensive samples
every time a new standard is proposed.
Answer: No.
Question: So you are just guessing?
Answer: It is better than a guess. It is based on the best information
available to us.
Question: Within the constraints of time and technology?
Answer: And resources.
Question: Of course. And the effects of the contamination on the other
organisms in the lake ecosystem that form part of the food
web of which your subject species is a part?
Answer: Again, to the best of our ability.
A principle that directs standards to be set at "contaminant levels which
are estimated to prevent permanent change to the population of the most
sensitive aquatic species in receiving water" is more meaningful than one
which says "prohibit pollution that harms the environment and endangers
human health." It is also more meaningful than having only a standard of
.02 jig/I with no articulation of the reason for the number. The abstractions
expressed by the regulator in the exchange above may not be a complete de-
scription of the information considered in making the decision, or the full
extent of the abstraction that is possible. Nor may it express an ideal rule.
However, it is a place to start. Furthermore, if that exchange expresses to
any extent the abstract idea that has determined the standard for substance
X, it should also be the abstract idea that governs the standard to be set for
substance Y, unless there are reasons that can be articulated why the first
decision can be distinguished and the same reasoning should not apply.
Consider another example of this process. Assume a vague statutory
objective of "protecting ecosystems." Consider the first proposal to which
that objective must be applied: a proposal to clear cut a section of forest.
Assume that the proposal is rejected. The reasoning of the decision maker is
that the ecosystem includes the trees and the other plant and animal life that
interact, directly or indirectly, with those trees. Therefore, concludes the
decision maker, a clear cut would adversely effect this particular ecosystem.
A second application proposes to cut down a single tree from a wooded
area. The vague objective, now interpreted in the first application, is ap-
plied. Cutting down one tree is allowed. The reasoning of the decision
maker is that taking one tree from the forest does not affect the system. It
is, taken literally, an effect, but it is not an effect in system terms because it
causes no long term change to the way the system functions. The tree is a
common species in this area of forest. The remaining population of trees is
[Vol. 34
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unaffected. The loss of the one tree is such a small physical change to the
habitat of the other, non-tree plant and animal species that these species are
not affected. In addition, the taking of one tree should not affect the rate of
tree reproduction: seeds from other trees will grow where seeds from the
taken tree might have taken root. Therefore, the result is different from, but
consistent with, the rejection of the first proposal.
A third application proposes to cut down twenty trees per acre. Tnis is
a more difficult case, and the answer may not be clear. But it is now less
difficult and more clear, and therefore less arbitrary, than working with a
bald directive of "protecting ecosystems." The articulation of the answer
develops the meaning of protecting ecosystems, which will in turn be ap-
plied to the next scenario.
There is nothing new or innovative about this method of making deci-
sions. The only remarkable thing about it is that it does not presently have a
central role in the development of environmental law. Would it create
overwhelming practical difficulties for environmental agencies, city plan-
ning departments, and other administrative bodies? How would they pro-
ceed with vast numbers of decisions if they cannot make those decisions in
isolation? Would they become adjudicators rather than administrators, bur-
dened with the need to produce reasons for every step? Are principles of
precedent simply unworkable in the context of any function other than
court-like adjudication? No firm answers can be given. There is no doubt
that creating a greater role for precedent, taking separation of powers seri-
ously, and providing for the development of abstract rules could not occur
within the present practice of environmental management and urban plan-
ning. It would not be possible simply to place new requirements on present
processes.
V. CONCLUSION
Environmental decision making could be conducted in a manner which
provides for the evolution of general rules. Environmental law could be
administered with articulate consistency if its processes separated the func-
tion of making rules from the function of applying them; if like cases were
expected to be decided alike; if the law was developed by abstracting gen-
eral rules from particular cases. Starting with vague statutory objectives
would be less troubling if each interpretation became a precedent for the one
following, if each result clarified the meaning of the objective a little bit
more, and if the interpreter was articulately consistent in justifying each new
result. Courts interpret and apply statutes in this way, but courts have a
relatively minor role in shaping environmental regulation and urban plan-
ning. The agencies that have the job of achieving the vague objectives are
fulfilling functions more administrative than judicial. Rarely do they con-
sider themselves to be bound by their previous decisions. They do not con-
sider that their primary responsibility is to be articulately consistent, but to
19981
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use their powers to fashion the right result, depending on the facts. So many
decisions must presently be made for the very reason that they are made in
isolation. If decisions were made according to a different set of procedural
principles, they could be made in accordance with a common set of abstract
ideas.
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